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It is well known that public or pooled insurance coverage can induce a form of ex-ante moral hazard:
people make inefficiently low investments in self-protective activities. This paper points out another
ex-ante moral hazard that arises through an induced innovation externality. This alternative mechanism,
by contrast, causes people to devote an inefficiently high level of self-protection.  
As an empirical example of this externality, we analyze the innovation induced by the obesity epidemic.
Obesity is associated with an increase in the incidence of many diseases. The induced innovation hypothesis
is that an increase in the incidence of a disease will increase technological innovation specific to that
disease. The empirical economics literature has produced substantial evidence in favor of the induced
innovation hypothesis.
We first estimate the associations between obesity and disease incidence. We then show that if these
associations are causal and the pharmaceutical reward system is optimal the magnitude of the induced
innovation externality of obesity roughly coincides with the Medicare-induced health insurance externality
of obesity. The current Medicare subsidy for obesity therefore appears to be approximately optimal.
We also show that the pattern of diseases for obese and normal weight individuals are similar enough
that the induced innovation externality of obesity on normal weight individuals is positive as well.
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Within economics, it is well-known that pooled insurance coverage can create a disincentive
for the insured individual to invest in self-protective activities ￿a form of ex-ante moral
hazard (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972). Much of the health economics literature, by contrast,
has focused on ex-post moral hazard induced by insurance coverage (Pauly, 1968; Manning
et al., 1987). Both the ex-ante moral hazard and the ex-post moral hazard lead to a negative
externality: the former causes people to invest insu¢ ciently in self-protection, while the
latter causes people to consume health care resources at an ine¢ ciently high level. In this
paper, we identify a distinct and non-mutually exclusive second form of ex-ante moral hazard
that runs in the opposite direction from the one identi￿ed by Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
The presence of a population with a given chronic condition within the general population
induces research e⁄orts by ￿rms to develop pharmaceutical and other products to treat the
diseases caused by the chronic condition. The resulting innovations bene￿t all people who
are a› icted with any of those diseases. This yields a positive externality: people do not
account for this induced innovation e⁄ect when they make the decisions that lead them to
develop the chronic condition. In other words, this mechanism causes people to devote an
ine¢ ciently high level of self-protection.
As an empirical example of this externality, we analyze the innovation induced by the
obesity epidemic. Obesity is associated with an increase in the incidence of many diseases.
The induced innovation hypothesis is that an increase in the incidence of a disease will
increase technological innovation speci￿c to that disease. The empirical economics literature
has produced substantial evidence in favor of the induced innovation hypothesis.
We ￿rst estimate the association between obesity and disease incidence. We then show
that if these associations are causal then the magnitude of the induced innovation external-
ity of obesity roughly coincides with the Medicare-induced health insurance externality of
obesity. The current subsidy for obesity therefore appears to be approximately optimal for
1people who are covered with private insurance before old-age. We also show that the pat-
tern of diseases for the obese and for the normal weight are similar enough that the induced
innovation externality of obesity on normal weight individuals is positive as well.1
In our analysis we do not assume that there exists a free lunch in pharmaceutical in-
novation. Instead, we assume that the pharmaceutical reward system is optimal from the
consumers￿perspective in the following sense: the bene￿t to consumers from the additional
innovation induced by any marginal increase in the reward for pharmaceutical innovation is
equal to the marginal increase in the reward for pharmaceutical innovation.2
2 Background
In this section, we provide cursory reviews of the extensive literatures that touch on our
argument. These include the clinical literature on the consequences of obesity, the health
economics literatures on the medical costs associated with obesity and on the external e⁄ects
of obesity in a pooled health insurance context, and the economics literature on the induced
innovation e⁄ect.
2.1 Obesity, Disease, and Health Expenditures
Americans are increasingly overweight or obese.3 The proportion of adults classi￿ed as
obese increased from 12.0% in 1991 to 20.9% in 2001 (Mokdad et al., 1999, 2003; Wang and
1In this paper, we ignore any ex-post moral hazard induced by obesity. There are two reasons why this
decision is justi￿able. First, the elasticity of demand for health care is larger (in absolute value) for those
without chronic conditions (Manning et al., 1987; Bajari et al., 2006). Second, Lakdawalla and Sood (2006)
show that when it comes to pharmaceutical expenditures, there may not be any ex-post moral hazard at all
￿co-payments make out-of-pocket prices close to marginal cost.
2We do not aim to settle the debate on whether patent duration is set at the right level for the reward
system to satisfy this property. Rather, the conclusions can be adjusted according to the reader￿ s beliefs
about this contentious issue.
3Body mass index (BMI) is the standard measure used to determine an appropriate weight in the medical
literature. BMI is weight, measured in kilograms, divided by height, measured in meters, squared. Individuals
with a BMI between 25 and 30 are considered overweight, while those with a BMI of 30 or more are considered
obese (National Institute on Health, 1998). Henceforth, we use BMI and body weight interchangeably.
2Beydoun, 2007).
Obesity is associated with an increased risk of a range of chronic conditions, including
diabetes, hypertension, heart disease, and stroke (Kasper et al., 2004). In some cases, there
are solid biochemical and physiological reasons to suppose that the association is causal,
such as in the case of diabetes. In other cases, the evidence is murkier. Associations such as
these arise for many reasons, not all of them medical. Here, we do not attempt to settle (nor
are we capable of settling) the debate over whether there is a causal relationship between
obesity and any particular chronic condition with which obesity is associated. Instead,
our aim is to show that if the e⁄ect of obesity on disease incidence is causal and obesity
therefore has a negative Medicare-induced public health insurance externality then obesity
has also a positive induced innovation externality. The Medicare-induced negative public
health insurance externality of obesity is therefore not a su¢ cient rationale for policies that
are directed toward reducing obesity.
Not surprisingly, expected health care expenditures are higher for obese individuals than
for normal weight individuals. A large number of studies document this fact. The vast
majority of these studies use convenience samples consisting of individuals from a single
employer or a single insurer (Elmer et al., 2004; Bertakis and Azari, 2005; Burton et al.,
1998; Raebel et al., 2004). There are also studies of obesity-related medical expenditure
di⁄erences in an international setting. Both Sander and Bergemann (2003), in a German
setting, and Katzmarzyk and Janssen (2004), in a Canadian setting, ￿nd higher medical
expenditures for obese people.
There are a few studies that use nationally representative data. Finkelstein et al. (2003)
use data from the linked National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS). They estimate that annual medical expenditures are $732 higher for
obese than normal weight individuals. On an aggregate level, approximately half of the
estimated $78.5 billion in medical care spending in 1998 attributable to excess body weight
3was ￿nanced through private insurance (38%) and patient out-of-pocket payments (14%).
Sturm (2002), using data from the Health Care for Communities (HCC) survey, ￿nds that
obese individuals spend $395 per year more than non-obese individuals on medical care.
Thorpe et al. (2004) also use MEPS data, but they are interested in how much of the
$1,100 increase between 1987 and 2000 in per-capita medical expenditures is attributable to
obesity. Using a regression model to calculate what per-capita medical expenditures would
have been had 1987 obesity levels persisted to 2000, they conclude that about $300 of the
$1,100 increase is due to the rise in obesity prevalence.
This is a large literature, which space constraints prevent us from surveying in more
detail. The many studies that we do not discuss here vary considerably in generality ￿some
examine data from a single company or from a single insurance source ￿though they all reach
the same qualitative conclusion that obesity is associated with higher medical care costs.4
None of this literature attempts to address whether the relationship between obesity and
associated health care expenditures are causal. We do not attempt to settle this issue here
and, for the same reasons outlined above on the link between obesity and disease incidence,
we do not need to settle it.
2.2 Health Insurance, Ex Ante Moral Hazard, and Induced Inno-
vation
That obesity is associated with higher health care expenditures is only a necessary ￿rst step in
establishing the traditional ex-ante welfare loss from obesity through health insurance. In the
case of employer-provided health insurance, for instance, Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005)
show that di⁄erences in wages between obese and non-obese workers with employer-provided
health insurance undo nominal risk pooling between the workers. Without no pooling, there
is no externality. This argument does not extend to public insurance, such as Medicare,
4Some of the studies we reviewed, but arbitrarily do not discuss here include Bungam et al. (2003), Musich
et al. (2004), Quesenberry et al. (1998), Thompson et al. (2001) and Wang et al. (2003).
4where there is clearly pooling, an induced transfer from thinner to heavier, and no wage
mechanism to undo it. Even in the case of public insurance, though, obese individuals are
likely to pay higher out-of-pocket medical expenditures because of cost-sharing in insurance
coverage. Being obese therefore imposes costs on the person holding the weight.
Bhattacharya and Sood (2007) show that, in pooled health insurance, if the elasticity
of body weight with respect to the transfer from thinner to heavier individuals (induced by
insurance) is zero, there is no welfare loss from the ex-ante externality. Unless the subsidy
induced by insurance causes someone to become heavier, the insurance transaction is a
costless transfer. With the exception of Rashad and Markowitz (2006), there has been little
work attempting to measure the size of this key elasticity.
To date, we are not aware of any work that has attempted to estimate the size of the
externality caused by ex-ante moral hazard through the induced innovation e⁄ect. Lak-
dawalla and Sood (2007) examine the e⁄ect of extending drug insurance on welfare through
induced innovation. In comparison, we focus on the ex-ante moral hazard e⁄ect of induced
innovation. We also distinguish between what the e⁄ect is on di⁄erent demographic groups,
such as normal weight individuals and the obese.
Our analysis is based on the induced innovation hypothesis put forward by Hicks (1932)
and Schmookler (1966). Empirical investigations of the induced innovation hypothesis in the
pharmaceutical industry include Acemoglu and Linn (2004), Finkelstein (2007), Lichtenberg
and Waldfogel (2003), and our companion paper (Bhattacharya and Packalen, 2008), which
all ￿nd support for the induced innovation hypothesis. Our companion paper also ￿nds
evidence of obesity-induced pharmaceutical innovation. Newell et al. (1999) and Popp (2002)
￿nd support for the induced innovation hypothesis in the energy sector.
Our analysis is also related to the studies on preference externalities by Waldfogel (2003)
and George and Waldfogel (2003).5 These studies examine the e⁄ect that the racial char-
5These contributions in turn build on the theoretical contributions by Hotelling (1929), Spence (1976a,b)
and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) on market size and product variety.
5acteristics of the population within a market have on the supply of radio programming and
newspapers. While these studies focus on the e⁄ect of population characteristics on product
variety, we seek to determine the e⁄ect of preference externalities both on the overall welfare
as well as on the welfare of the obese and the normal weight separately. Furthermore, in our
case the preference externality is determined by consumers￿decisions rather than inherent
characteristics (to extent that body weight is in fact a decision).
3 An Induced Innovation Externality Model
Our analysis of the induced innovation externality is based on four principles. First, the
extent of innovation of drug therapies for a disease depends on the size of the entire world-
wide potential market for pharmaceuticals for the disease. Second, the induced innovation
externality of obesity is calculated as the e⁄ect that a marginal increase in obesity in the
United States has on the consumer surplus of the population in the United States. This
de￿nition facilitates a direct comparison of the induced innovation externality of obesity
with the Medicare-induced health insurance externality of obesity. We therefore ignore the
induced innovation externality that a marginal increase in obesity in the United States has
on consumers in the rest of the world. Third, we assume that pharmaceutical producers
accurately forecast any marginal increase in obesity prevalence and hence such an increase
immediately a⁄ects the rate of pharmaceutical innovation. This assumption is not crucial
for our results because only a small fraction of the lifetime induced innovation externality of
obesity is due to the e⁄ect that obesity has on an individual￿ s annual pharmaceutical expen-
ditures before the individual reaches mid-age. Fourth, we assume that the pharmaceutical
reward system is privately optimal for the consumers in the United States in the sense that
a marginal increase in the annual reward for pharmaceutical innovation yields an equivalent
increase in the annual stream of consumer surplus from pharmaceutical innovation that is
captured by the population in the United States.
6Both body weight and age have a strong impact on a person￿ s annual pharmaceutical and
other health care expenditures, and the e⁄ects vary across diseases. Let Et;i (normal) and
Et;i (obese) denote the mean annual expenditures on drug therapies for disease i for normal
weight and for obese individuals, respectively, at age t. Let ￿ Ei denote the average annual
expenditures on drug therapies for disease i. The potential market size for drug therapies for
disease i is NWORLD￿ ￿ Ei, where NWORLD is the size of the world-wide population. Measuring
the potential market size by expenditures rather than disease incidence allows for obesity to
in￿ uence pharmaceutical expenditures both through the e⁄ect that obesity has on disease
incidence and through the e⁄ect that obesity has on the intensity at which an individual
consumes drug therapies for a disease conditional on having that disease.
The reward that pharmaceutical ￿rms receive annually from an individual for inventing
drug therapies that treat the disease i and that are introduced either before or during a
given year is a ￿xed share RPATENT ￿ (1 ￿ RMC) of the individual￿ s annual expenditures
Et;i on drug therapies that treat disease i. The coe¢ cient RPATENT is the share of the
pharmaceutical revenue that is captured by brand-name drugs. The factor (1 ￿ RMC) is the
share of the revenue for brand-name drugs that the pharmaceutical ￿rms receive in excess
of variable (production, marketing, and general administration) costs.
We assume that the consumer surplus Vt;i that an individual at age t receives from new
drug therapies for the disease i is a ￿xed percentage RCS of the reward for innovation that
the pharmaceutical ￿rms receive from the individual for new drug therapies for the disease
i. Pharmaceutical innovation therefore increases the individual￿ s lifetime expected consumer
surplus annually by
Vt;i = RCS ￿ RPATENT ￿ (1 ￿ RMC) ￿ Et;i (1)
at age t.
Consider now the e⁄ect of one person becoming obese. For this individual the incidence
of disease i changes from Et;i (normal) to Et;i (obese). This change in the disease incidence
7changes the potential market size for new drug therapies that treat the disease i. This in turn
changes the rate of innovation of drug therapies for the disease i. We denote the associated
percentage change in the rate of innovation of drug therapies for the disease i by ￿Ii.
We divide the change in the rate of innovation, ￿Ii, into two separate e⁄ects: the com-
position e⁄ect and the general rate of innovation e⁄ect. The composition e⁄ect is the e⁄ect
that the change in the disease incidence has on the relative allocation of pharmaceutical
R&D across diseases and on the associated the rate of innovation for the disease i relative
to all other diseases. The general rate of innovation e⁄ect is the e⁄ect that the change in
the disease incidence has on the overall level of pharmaceutical R&D and on the associated
general speed of pharmaceutical innovation.
The composition e⁄ect is given by ￿MR
i ￿ "c; where ￿MR
i is the percentage e⁄ect that
the change in the disease incidence has on the relative potential market size of drug therapies












and where "c is the associated reward-elasticity of the composition of innovation.
The general rate of innovation e⁄ect is given by ￿M ￿ ", where ￿M is the percentage
e⁄ect that the change in the disease incidence has on the total pharmaceutical market size:
￿M ￿
P
i [Et;i (obese) ￿ Et;i (normal)]
P
i ￿ Ei ￿ NWORLD
; (3)
and where " is the associated reward-elasticity of innovation.




i ￿ "c + ￿M ￿ "; (4)
8where generally "c ￿ ".6 We assume that " > 0. The equality "c = " holds in the special
case that the allocation of R&D resources for each disease is independent of the demand for
R&D resources for the innovation of drug therapies for all other diseases.
When the rate of innovation changes by ￿Ii the associated change in the stream of
consumer surplus from pharmaceutical innovation for disease i is Vt;i ￿￿Ii for an individual
with annual pharmaceutical expenditures Et;i. The total induced innovation externality of
the marginal increase in obesity over all diseases is therefore
P
i Vt;i ￿ ￿Ii for an individual
with annual pharmaceutical expenditures Et;i. Using the expressions (1) and (4) for Vt;i and








i ￿ "c + ￿M ￿ "
￿
: (5)
The expression (2) for the e⁄ect that the marginal increase in obesity has on the relative









































when NWORLD is large. Solving the equality (7) for ￿MR
i and substituting the resulting
expression for ￿MR
i as well as the expression (3) for ￿M into the expression (5) for the
obesity externality yields the following expression for the induced innovation externality of









because this term is small compared to the terms ￿Mi ￿ " and ￿MR




























Consider now the e⁄ect of a one percent increase in the pharmaceutical reward in every
disease category from the subpopulation of NUS individuals. This increases the total phar-
maceutical reward by
NUS
NWORLD percent for all diseases. As the relative market sizes across
disease categories do not change, the rate of pharmaceutical innovation and the bene￿t from
pharmaceutical innovation increase by "￿
NUS
NWORLD percent for all diseases. By the de￿nition
of RCS the average bene￿t from pharmaceutical innovation is RCS times the pharmaceutical
reward. For the subpopulation of NUS individuals the cost of the one percent increase in
the pharmaceutical reward the subpopulation is therefore 1=RCS percent of the total bene￿t
that the population of NUS individuals receives from pharmaceutical innovation.
Because we assume that for a subpopulation of NUS individuals, where NUS < NWORLD,
the pharmaceutical reward system is privately optimal in the sense that a marginal increase
in the reward for pharmaceutical innovation from the subpopulation yields an equivalent
increase in the total consumer surplus for the subpopulation, the cost of the one percent
increase in the pharmaceutical reward from the subpopulation of NUS individuals (which is
1
RCS percent of total bene￿t from pharmaceutical innovation) must equal the bene￿t of the
increase for the subpopulation of NUS individuals (which is "￿
NUS
NWORLD percent of the total








Solving the expression (9) for RCS and substituting the resulting expression into the ex-


























Substituting the average expenditures ￿ Ei for Et;i in the expression (10) for the externality
and denoting Et (normal) ￿
P
i Et;i (normal) and Et (obese) ￿
P
i Et;i (obese) gives the




￿RPATENT ￿(1 ￿ RMC)￿[Et (obese) ￿ Et (normal)]: (11)
The total induced innovation externality of obesity on the subpopulation of NUS individ-
uals is NUS times the average externality. The total externality is therefore given by
Externalityt (total) = RPATENT ￿ (1 ￿ RMC) ￿ [Et (obese) ￿ Et (normal)]: (12)
The expressions (11) and (12) for the average externality and total externality, respec-
tively, show that neither the average externality nor the total externality depend on the
prevalence of obesity in the population or the two innovation elasticities " and "c. In-
stead, both externalities depend only on the total e⁄ect that the marginal increase in obe-
sity has on the reward that pharmaceutical companies receive for successful innovation.
This result is a consequence of the assumption that the reward system is optimal from
the consumers￿ perspective: the share RPATENT ￿ (1 ￿ RMC) of the additional revenue
11[Et (obese) ￿ Et (normal)] is reward for pharmaceutical innovation and the reward must
equal the total bene￿t Externalityt (total) for the consumers from the associated increase in
innovation. In section 6 we calculate the total externality at each age after estimating Et;i;
Et;i (normal) and Et;i (obese) and calibrating the parameters RPATENT and RMC:
Because the pattern of disease incidence is di⁄erent for the normal weight than it is for
the obese, the bene￿t from the marginal increase in obesity varies by body weight. We
therefore also calculate the magnitude of the induced innovation externality by body weight.
Let Ei (normal) denote the average pharmaceutical expenditures of the normal weight for
disease i. Substituting Ei (normal) for Et;i in the expression (10) for the externality gives




























Similarly, letting Ei (obese) denote the average pharmaceutical expenditures of the obese for
disease i and substituting Ei (obese) for Et;i in the expression (10) for the externality gives




























12In section 6 we calculate the externality on the normal weight Externalityt (normal) and
the externality on the obese Externalityt (obese) for di⁄erent values of the ratio "c
" .
4 Data
We use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data from years 1996-2005 to estimate
disease incidence, pharmaceutical expenditures and total health care expenditures by age and
Body-Mass Index (BMI) group. Because MEPS from years 1996-2000 does not include BMI
information we use the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data from years 1996-2000
and the match between the NHIS data and the MEPS data to ￿nd the BMI information
for individuals during years 1996-2000. In the data, each subject is followed for two years,
except in panel 10 which started in 2005. The data consists of 262,958 observations on
149,737 individuals.
We estimate disease incidence from the self-reported data in the MEPS. In MEPS the dis-
eases are coded by the International Classi￿cation of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9). We
use the MEPS data also to estimate total health care expenditures and total pharmaceutical
expenditures. To estimate pharmaceutical expenditures by the therapeutic category of drugs
we match the MEPS data on pharmaceutical expenditures by individual drugs (which are
reported by the subject and the subject￿ s pharmacy) to the National Ambulatory Medical
Care Survey (NAMCS) data by drug name. We use the NAMCS data from years 1995, 2000,
and 2005.7 We only match the drugs in NAMCS that have only one therapeutic category.
In some cases we combine therapeutic categories when the drugs in the original categories
7For each drug mention in NAMCS we assign the therapeutic category in NAMCS from the 2005 NAMCS
if a therapeutic category exists for the active ingredient in the 2005 NAMCS. For active ingredients without
a therapeutic category in the 2005 NAMCS we assign the therapeutic category in NAMCS from the 2000
NAMCS if a therapeutic category exists for the active ingredient in the 2000 NAMCS. For active ingredients
without a therapeutic category in the 2005 NAMCS and in the 2000 NAMCS we assign the therapeutic
category in NAMCS from the 1995 NAMCS if a therapeutic category exists for the active ingredient in the
1995 NAMCS.
13may be used to treat the same diseases.8
5 Obesity and Disease Incidence
In this section we report the association between obesity and disease incidence by disease as
well as the association between obesity and pharmaceutical expenditures by the therapeutic
category. The e⁄ect of obesity varies greatly by age, race and sex. We therefore form a
composite measure of the association of obesity and disease incidence. Namely, for each
disease we estimate the association between obesity and the incidence of the disease for a
randomly chosen person.
Let rt denote the share of individuals in the age group t, and let ￿t;i (normal) and
￿t;i (obese) denote the incidence of disease i for the normal weight individuals in the age
group t and for obese individuals in the age group t, respectively. Within each age group
we also allow the disease incidence to vary by sex, race (black/non-black), insurance status
(private/non-private) and year (linear trend). However, for notational convenience we omit
these subscripts here.
The incidence of the disease i for a randomly chosen normal weight individual is
P
t rt ￿
￿t;i (normal) and the incidence of the disease i for a randomly chosen obese individual is
P
t rt ￿ ￿t;i (obese). An estimate of the association between obesity and disease incidence
can therefore be obtained by calculating
Effecti ￿
P
t rt ￿ ￿t;i (obese) ￿
P
t rt ￿ ￿t;i (normal)
P
t rt ￿ ￿t;i (normal)
￿ 100% (15)
for each disease i. If the estimated associations are causal e⁄ects, then the estimates measure
the e⁄ect that the obesity of a randomly chosen individual has on the incidence of the disease
8We combine therapeutic categories with less than 200 observations in MEPS to therapeutic category
"Other". We also assign unmatched drugs to the therapeutic category "Other". In total, approximately
15% of pharmaceutical expenditures in the MEPS data are assigned to the "Other" category.
14i for that individual.




t rt ￿ ￿ ￿t;i ￿
P
t rt ￿ ￿t;i (normal)
P
t rt ￿ ￿ ￿t;i
￿ 100%; (16)
where ￿ ￿t;i is the average incidence of the disease i in the age group t and is de￿ned as









t ; sOV ERWEIGHT
t and sOBESE
t denote the share of the normal weight, the
overweight, and the obese, respectively, in the age group t.
We divide the population into the following age groups: 0-18, 18-35, 35-50, 50-65 and
65+. We classify individuals with BMI 18.5-25 as normal weight, individuals with BMI 25-30
as overweight, and individuals with BMI 30-50 as obese. For individuals in the age group
0-18 we do not construct separate estimates of the disease incidence by body weight.
The estimated associations between obesity and disease incidence are calculated using
the MEPS data. The results are shown in Figures 1.1-1.18 (all ￿gures are in the Appendix).9
The ICD-9 disease classi￿cation contains 18 disease classes. Each of the ￿gures shows the
results for all diseases within one disease class.10 We also calculate the e⁄ect of obesity
on pharmaceutical expenditures by the therapeutic category of drugs using the matched
MEPS and NAMCS data. The e⁄ects by the therapeutic category are calculated by replac-
ing the disease incidence parameters ￿ ￿i;j; ￿i;j (normal); ￿i;j (overweight) and ￿i;j (obese) in
the expressions (15), (16) and (17) with the corresponding measures of pharmaceutical ex-
penditures ￿ Et;i; Et;i (normal); Et;i (overweight) and Et;i (obese) for each body weight group
9The 99% con￿dence intervals (CI) are calculated using cluster-robust standard errors with clustering at
the subject level.
10For each disease class we combine diseases with less than 100 observations in the MEPS with other such
diseases to category "000 Other diseases in the disease class".
15and age group combination. The estimated associations between obesity and pharmaceutical
expenditures are shown in Figure 2.11
The results show signi￿cant variation in the association between obesity and disease
incidence both across diseases within each disease class and across all diseases. The variation
in the association between obesity and disease incidence across diseases is important for two
reasons. First, in our companion paper (Bhattacharya and Packalen, 2008) this variation
enables us to identify the empirical e⁄ect of obesity on pharmaceutical innovation. Second,
the variation implies that the induced innovation externality of obesity on the normal weight
may be negative. This is because an increase in obesity will change the relative potential
market sizes across diseases which in turn may shift resources toward diseases for which the
incidence among normal weight individuals is relatively low compared to the average disease
incidence across diseases for normal weight individuals.
The results also suggest several interesting results that to our knowledge have not been
explored in the medical literature. We ￿nd that sexually transmitted diseases HIV, Herpes
Simplex and Chlamydia (in disease class 1) are negatively associated with obesity. Second,
malignant and non-malignant skin cancer (in disease class 2) are negatively associated with
obesity. Third, contraceptive use (in the disease class 18 and as a therapeutic category) is
negatively associated with obesity. We do not suggest that these are physiological conse-
quences of obesity but rather that they result from behavioral changes that are caused the
limiting e⁄ect that obesity has on an individual￿ s choice set. Future work should explore
whether these associations are indeed causal.
11Within each age group we again allow the disease incidence to vary by sex, race (black/non-black),
insurance status (private/non-private) and year (linear trend). To eliminate outliers we drop observations
where pharmaceutical expenditures in a particular therapeutic category exceed $10,000.
166 The Externality Calculations
We ￿rst calibrate the parameters RPATENT and RMC: Berndt (2001) reports that the share
of o⁄-patent generics is approximately 50% of the dispensed drug units. Because brand-name
drugs cost more than generics we calibrate the share of the marginal pharmaceutical revenue
that goes to brand-name drugs at RPATENT = 0:80: Reinhardt (2001) cites estimates for the
pharmaceutical industry that place marketing and general administration costs at 35% of
revenue and manufacturing costs at 27% of revenue, but notes that ￿rms in the pharmaceu-
tical industry often manufacture also other goods than brand-name drugs. Estimating the
share 1￿RMC of the marginal revenue from brand-name drugs that is in excess of marginal
costs is therefore di¢ cult. We calibrate it at 1 ￿ RMC = 0:66.
Using the calibrated values of the parameters RPATENT and RMC we ￿rst estimate the
total induced innovation externality of obesity at each age using the expression (12) and
MEPS data on total pharmaceutical expenditures.12 As our later objective is to compare
the induced innovation externality of obesity with the Medicare-induced health insurance
externality of obesity for individuals who are covered by private insurance before old-age,
for ages 0-65 we construct the estimates of pharmaceutical expenditures using data on only
individuals who are covered by private insurance. For ages 65+ we construct the estimates
from data on individuals who are covered by either public or private insurance.
The results are shown in Figure 3. Because the total externality is a ￿xed percentage of
the obesity-induced increase in a person￿ s annual pharmaceutical expenditures, the path of
the externality follows the path of the increase in annual pharmaceutical expenditures that
is due to obesity and thus increases sharply between ages 25 and 55. Overall, the estimate
12To eliminate concern over possible time e⁄ects in the pharmaceutical expenditures data we use only
MEPS data from years 2002-2005 in the analyses in this section.
In the calculations in this section we use the following age groups: 0-18, 18-25, 25-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45,
45-50, 50-55, 55-60, 60-65, 65-70, 70-75, 75-80, 80+, and the following BMI groups: 18.5-25 (normal weight),
25-30 (overweight), and 30-50 (obese). In addition to allowing the expenditures to vary by age and body
weight, we allow the expenditures to vary by sex and race (black/non-black).
17of the total induced innovation externality of obesity as a function of age shows that while
the magnitude of the externality that a marginal increase in obesity has on an individual
depends greatly on the age of the individual, on average the magnitude of the externality is
substantial.
We next calculate the average externality, the externality on the normal weight and the
externality on the obese separately using the expressions (11), (13), and (14), respectively.13
For these calculations we use the matched MEPS and NAMCS data on pharmaceutical
expenditures by the therapeutic category of drugs.
Figure 4.1 shows the results for the three externalities when the ratio of the reward-
elasticity of the composition of pharmaceutical innovation ("c) and the reward-elasticity of
total pharmaceutical innovation (") is set at "c
" = 2: In this case the externality on other
obese people is approximately 50% higher than the average externality, and the externality
on the normal weight is positive and substantial at almost any age.14 Figure 4.2 shows the
results for the three externalities when the ratio of the two innovation elasticities is set at
"c
" = 4: Even when the ratio of elasticities is set this high the externality on the normal
weight is generally positive. Figure 4.3 shows the results for the three externalities when
the ratio of the two innovation elasticities is set at an extreme "c
" = 8: In this seemingly
unrealistic case obesity now has a substantial negative externality on the normal weight.
We next calculate the cumulative induced innovation externality of obesity and compare
it with the cumulative Medicare-induced health insurance externality of obesity. The present
value of the cumulative total induced innovation externality of obesity from the initial age
13In these calculations calibrate the U.S. Population at NUS = 300;000;000:
14A possibility that is not taken into account in these calculations is that obesity might shift resources
from research that potentially bene￿ts everyone to obesity-speci￿c research. We do not think that this
is a signi￿cant issue for our purposes because while obesity accounts for roughly 10% of all health care
expenditures, in 2005 among all publications in the MEDLINE database of biomedical publications less than
2% mention the word "obesity", the word "obese", the words "body mass index" or the acronym "bmi" in
either the abstract or the title of the publication (and less than 1% if one considers only the title).





t￿t0 ￿ Externalityt (total); (18)
where ￿ is the discount factor and Externalityt (total) is the total externality at age t and is
calculated using the expression (12). The present value of the cumulative Medicare-induced





t￿t0 ￿ m ￿ [Tt (obese) ￿ Tt (normal)]; (19)
where m is the share of the marginal health care expenditures paid by Medicare, and
Tt (normal) and Tt (obese) are the average annual health care expenditures at age t for
the normal weight and for the obese, respectively, and are estimated from the MEPS data.
We also calculate the present value of the cumulative Medicare-induced insurance externality
of obesity from pharmaceutical expenditures alone.15
We calibrate the discount factor at ￿ = 0:97 and the initial age at t0 = 18: The share of
health care expenditures covered by Medicare for people aged 65 and over is approximately
50% in the MEPS data. While this average rate may not coincide with the marginal rate,
we assume that for people aged 65 and over medicare pays 50% of the increase in health care
expenditures that is caused by obesity by setting m = 0:5.16 We calculate the cumulative
externalities as a function of the terminal age T:
The results are shown in Figure 5. For a person with terminal age 80, which roughly
equals life expectancy, the present value of the (positive) cumulative induced innovation ex-
ternality of obesity from pharmaceutical expenditures is much larger than the present value
15The Medicare-induced insurance expenditure for pharmaceutical expenditures alone is calculated as PT
t=minft0;65g ￿
t￿t0 ￿ m ￿ [Et (obese) ￿ Et (normal)];
16This proportion is presumably higher now since Medicare started in 2006 to cover pharmaceutical ex-
penditures through its Part D program.
19of the (negative) Medicare-induced insurance externality from pharmaceutical expenditures
and is similar in magnitude as the present value of the (negative) cumulative Medicare-
induced public health insurance externality from all health care expenditures. Of course,
the exact value of the induced innovation externality of obesity is sensitive to the assump-
tions about the parameters. However, we suspect that the conclusion that the magnitudes
of the two opposing externalities of obesity are the same is robust. Moreover, we have ig-
nored the induced innovation externality of obesity from all other medical expenditures than
pharmaceutical expenditures.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we argue that an analysis of the ex-ante moral hazard should not stop at
the disincentive e⁄ects of insurance on self-protective activities. To demonstrate that our
argument is also quantitatively important we examine the obesity epidemic as an empirical
example.
While the e⁄ects of obesity on the incidence of all individual diseases are not known,
obesity is known to increase the health care costs for a person. It is also well known that
given the health care costs of obesity and the existence of public health insurance programs
obesity has a negative externality. Moreover, another commonly held view is that since
obesity is at least to some degree the result of an individual￿ s decisions and an individual
does not bear the full costs of obesity, public policies aimed at increasing the costs of obesity
for an individual may be justi￿ed. In this paper we have challenged this perspective on
obesity.
Our analysis is based on the induced innovation hypothesis, which has broad empirical
support. Any increase in obesity that increases the incidence of a disease increases the po-
tential market size for new drug therapies for the disease and, by the induced innovation
hypothesis, also the rate of innovation of drug therapies for the disease. The induced inno-
20vation externality arises because this increase in innovation of drug therapies for the disease
bene￿ts all people who are a› icted with the disease.
Our results show that the magnitude of the induced innovation externality of obesity is
substantial. We show that the present value of the cumulative induced innovation externality
from pharmaceutical expenditures roughly coincides with the present value of the Medicare-
induced health insurance externality from total health care expenditures. We also show that,
while the externality on the normal weight is smaller than the average externality, it too is
likely to be positive.
Our estimates of the associations between obesity and disease incidence replicate many
￿ndings in the medical literature but also reveal several interesting associations that to
our knowledge have not been explored in the medical literature.17 Overall, the estimates
show considerable variation in the association between obesity and disease incidence across
diseases. We show that the average induced innovation externality of obesity is una⁄ected
by this variation across diseases.
Finally, because preference externalities in health care have direct policy implications,
identifying and quantifying other such externalities than the pharmaceutical innovation ex-
ternality examined here is an important topic for future research.
17Namely, we show that obesity is associated with a decrease in the incidence of skin cancer, sexually
transmitted diseases and contraceptive use. These associations are likely consequences of behavioral responses
to obesity rather than direct physiological e⁄ects.
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26Appendix
Figure 1.1: Associations between Obesity and Infections and Parasitic Diseases.
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005 Other food poisoning (bacterial)
008 Intestinal infections due to other organisms
111 Dermatomycosis, other and unspecified
034 Streptococcal sore throat and scarlet fever
079 Viral infection in conditions classified elsewhere and of unspecified site
009 Ill-defined intestinal infections
041 Bacterial infection in conditions classified elsewhere and of unspecified site
000 Other disease in disease class 1
074 Specific diseases due to Coxsackie virus
133 Acariasis
052 Chickenpox
057 Other viral exanthemata
132 Pediculosis and phthirus infestation
053 Herpes zoster
078 Other diseases due to viruses and Chlamydiae
011 Pulmonary tuberculosis
075 Infectious mononucleosis
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1. INFECTIOUS AND PARASITIC DISEASES
27Figure 1.2: Associations between Obesity and Neoplasms.
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179 Malignant neoplasm of uterus, part unspecified
211 Benign neoplasm of other parts of digestive system
214 Lipoma
215 Other benign neoplasm of connective and other soft tissue
202 Other malignant neoplasm of lymphoid and histiocytic tissue
174 Malignant neoplasm of female breast
185 Malignant neoplasm of prostate
153 Malignant neoplasm of colon
208 Leukemia of unspecified cell type
000 Other disease in disease class 2
218 Uterine leiomyoma
239 Neoplasm of unspecified nature
199 Malignant neoplasm without specification of site
180 Malignant neoplasm of cervix uteri
217 Benign neoplasm of breast
162 Malignant neoplasm of trachea, bronchus, and lung
216 Benign neoplasm of skin
238 Neoplasm of uncertain behavior of other and unspecified sites and tissues
173 Other malignant neoplasm of skin
229 Benign neoplasm of other and unspecified sites
195 Malignant neoplasm of other and ill-defined sites
232 Carcinoma in situ of skin
188 Malignant neoplasm of bladder
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2. NEOPLASMS
28Figure 1.3: Associations between Obesity and Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic Diseases.
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250 Diabetes mellitus
274 Gout
276 Disorders of fluid, electrolyte, and acid-base balance
275 Disorders of mineral metabolism
256 Ovarian dysfunction
272 Disorders of lipoid metabolism
240 Simple and unspecified goiter
266 Deficiency of B-complex components
269 Other nutritional deficiencies
242 Thyrotoxicosis with or without goiter
246 Other disorders of thyroid
244 Acquired hypothyroidism
000 Other disease in disease class 3
251 Other disorders of pancreatic internal secretion
259 Other endocrine disorders
277 Other and unspecified disorders of metabolism
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3. ENDOCRINE, NUTRITIONAL AND METABOLIC DISEASES, AND IMMUNITY DISORDERS
29Figure 1.4: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of Blood and Blood-forming Organs.
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280 Iron deficiency anemias
289 Other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs
285 Other and unspecified anemias
288 Diseases of white blood cells
000 Other disease in disease class 4
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4. DISEASES OF BLOOD AND BLOOD-FORMING ORGANS
30Figure 1.5: Associations between Obesity and Mental Disorders.
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311 Depressive disorder, not elsewhere classified
302 Sexual deviations and disorders
315 Specific delays in development
319 Unspecified mental retardation
300 Neurotic disorders
000 Other disease in disease class 5
308 Acute reaction to stress
307 Special symptoms or syndromes, not elsewhere classified
312 Disturbance of conduct, not elsewhere classified
299 Psychoses with origin specific to childhood
298 Other nonorganic psychoses
305 Nondependent abuse of drugs
314 Hyperkinetic syndrome of childhood
306 Physiological malfunction arising from mental factors
304 Drug dependence
303 Alcohol dependence syndrome
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5. MENTAL DISORDERS
31Figure 1.6: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Nervous System and Sense Organs.
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354 Mononeuritis of upper limb and mononeuritis multiplex
322 Meningitis of unspecified cause
356 Hereditary and idiopathic peripheral neuropathy
349 Other and unspecified disorders of the nervous system
351 Facial nerve disorders
355 Mononeuritis of lower limb
336 Other diseases of spinal cord
361 Retinal detachments and defects
340 Multiple sclerosis
345 Epilepsy
333 Other extrapyramidal disease and abnormal movement disorders
365 Glaucoma
343 Infantile cerebral palsy
386 Vertiginous syndromes and other disorders of vestibular system
353 Nerve root and plexus disorders
369 Blindness and low vision
382 Suppurative and unspecified otitis media
381 Nonsuppurative otitis media and Eustachian tube disorders
368 Visual disturbances
388 Other disorders of ear
366 Cataract
346 Migraine
371 Corneal opacity and other disorders of cornea
389 Hearing loss
372 Disorders of conjunctiva
378 Strabismus and other disorders of binocular eye movements
379 Other disorders of eye
360 Disorders of the globe
380 Disorders of external ear
384 Other disorders of tympanic membrane
367 Disorders of refraction and accommodation
374 Other disorders of eyelids
362 Other retinal disorders
348 Other conditions of brain
000 Other disease in disease class 6
375 Disorders of lacrimal system
344 Other paralytic syndromes
373 Inflammation of eyelids
332 Parkinson's disease
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6. DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM AND SENSE ORGANS
32Figure 1.7: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Circulatory System.
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428 Heart failure
401 Essential hypertension
451 Phlebitis and thrombophlebitis
413 Angina pectoris
453 Other venous embolism and thrombosis
414 Other forms of chronic ischemic heart disease
429 Ill-defined descriptions and complications of heart disease
000 Other disease in disease class 7
447 Other disorders of arteries and arterioles
444 Arterial embolism and thrombosis
410 Acute myocardial infarction
440 Atherosclerosis
412 Old myocardial infarction
459 Other disorders of circulatory system
454 Varicose veins of lower extremities
427 Cardiac dysrhythmias
455 Hemorrhoids
436 Acute but ill-defined cerebrovascular disease
456 Varicose veins of other sites
426 Conduction disorders
438 Late effects of cerebrovascular disease
458 Hypotension
424 Other diseases of endocardium
435 Transcient cerebral ischemia
442 Other aneurysm
443 Other peripheral vascular disease
433 Occlusion and stenosis of precerebral arteries
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7. DISEASES OF THE CIRCULATORY SYSTEM
33Figure 1.8: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Respiratory System.
491. Effect: 100% Share: 20%
485. Effect: 76% Share: 21%
493. Effect: 60% Share: 16%
466. Effect: 46% Share: 10%
000. Effect: 43% Share: 15%
514. Effect: 40% Share: 10%
486. Effect: 39% Share: 11%
490. Effect: 36% Share: 11%
496. Effect: 31% Share: 0%
518. Effect: 28% Share: 1%
461. Effect: 27% Share: 6%
474. Effect: 26% Share: 15%
465. Effect: 23% Share: 7%
478. Effect: 21% Share: 7%
463. Effect: 20% Share: 5%
519. Effect: 15% Share: 5%
472. Effect: 15% Share: -1%
470. Effect: 15% Share: -1%
511. Effect: 12% Share: 4%
473. Effect: 12% Share: 4%
464. Effect: 11% Share: 6%
477. Effect: 10% Share: 3%
487. Effect: 2% Share: 0%
460. Effect: 1% Share: 0%
462. Effect: -1% Share: 0%
492. Effect: -34% Share: -26%
491 Chronic bronchitis
485 Bronchopneumonia, organism unspecified
493 Asthma
466 Acute bronchitis and bronchiolitis
000 Other disease in disease class 8
514 Pulmonary congestion and hypostasis
486 Pneumonia, organism unspecified
490 Bronchitis, not specified as acute or chronic
496 Chronic airways obstruction, not elsewhere classified
518 Other diseases of lung
461 Acute sinusitis
474 Chronic disease of tonsils and adenoids
465 Acute upper respiratory infections of multiple or unspecified sites
478 Other diseases of upper respiratory tract
463 Acute tonsillitis
519 Other diseases of respiratory system
472 Chronic pharyngitis and nasopharyngitis
470 Deviated nasal septum
511 Pleurisy
473 Chronic sinusitis
464 Acute laryngitis and tracheitis
477 Allergic rhinitis
487 Influenza
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8. DISEASES OF THE RESPIRATORY SYSTEM
34Figure 1.9: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Digestive System.
574. Effect: 154% Share: 34%
575. Effect: 144% Share: 33%
533. Effect: 103% Share: 24%
530. Effect: 81% Share: 23%
573. Effect: 74% Share: 22%
571. Effect: 66% Share: 11%
553. Effect: 63% Share: 17%
562. Effect: 58% Share: 21%
531. Effect: 40% Share: 15%
537. Effect: 35% Share: 14%
522. Effect: 35% Share: 10%
560. Effect: 34% Share: -10%
535. Effect: 22% Share: 10%
000. Effect: 20% Share: 4%
525. Effect: 17% Share: 3%
536. Effect: 15% Share: 5%
564. Effect: 15% Share: 0%
569. Effect: 8% Share: 1%
541. Effect: 8% Share: -4%
578. Effect: 4% Share: 0%
521. Effect: 4% Share: -2%
558. Effect: 2% Share: 2%
577. Effect: -1% Share: -13%
523. Effect: -4% Share: -4%
528. Effect: -5% Share: -3%
520. Effect: -6% Share: -2%
527. Effect: -11% Share: -7%
524. Effect: -11% Share: -12%
526. Effect: -14% Share: -4%
556. Effect: -16% Share: 13%
555. Effect: -32% Share: -25%
550. Effect: -35% Share: -27%
574 Cholelithiasis
575 Other disorders of gallbladder
533 Peptic ulcer, site unspecified
530 Diseases of esophagus
573 Other disorders of liver
571 Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis
553 Other hernia of abdominal cavity without mention of obstruction or gangrene
562 Diverticula of intestine
531 Gastric ulcer
537 Other disorders of stomach and duodenum
522 Diseases of pulp and periapical tissues
560 Intestinal obstruction without mention of hernia
535 Gastritis and duodenitis
000 Other disease in disease class 9
525 Other diseases and conditions of the teeth and supporting structures
536 Disorders of function of stomach
564 Functional digestive disorders, not elsewhere classified
569 Other disorders of intestine
541 Appendicitis, unqualified
578 Gastrointestinal hemorrhage
521 Diseases of hard tissues of teeth
558 Other noninfective gastroenteritis and colitis
577 Diseases of pancreas
523 Gingival and periodontal diseases
528 Diseases of the oral soft tissues, excluding lesions specific for gingiva and tongue
520 Disorders of tooth development and eruption
527 Diseases of the salivary glands
524 Dentofacial anomalies, including malocclusion
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9. DISEASES OF THE DIGESTIVE SYSTEM
35Figure 1.10: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Genitourinary System.
592. Effect: 87% Share: 23%
590. Effect: 65% Share: 20%
596. Effect: 55% Share: 14%
593. Effect: 45% Share: 10%
586. Effect: 30% Share: -1%
621. Effect: 26% Share: 11%
608. Effect: 25% Share: 10%
626. Effect: 24% Share: 5%
607. Effect: 24% Share: -1%
629. Effect: 16% Share: 11%
602. Effect: 11% Share: 5%
000. Effect: 5% Share: -11%
599. Effect: 1% Share: 1%
611. Effect: -1% Share: -1%
600. Effect: -2% Share: 4%
625. Effect: -4% Share: -1%
614. Effect: -5% Share: -7%
595. Effect: -6% Share: -4%
618. Effect: -6% Share: 10%
617. Effect: -6% Share: -2%
623. Effect: -7% Share: -6%
616. Effect: -7% Share: -8%
627. Effect: -9% Share: -6%
601. Effect: -12% Share: -9%
620. Effect: -16% Share: -9%
610. Effect: -22% Share: -18%
628. Effect: -30% Share: -10%
622. Effect: -36% Share: -10%
592 Calculus of kidney and ureter
590 Infections of kidney
596 Other disorders of bladder
593 Other disorders of kidney and ureter
586 Renal failure, unspecified
621 Disorders of uterus, not elsewhere classified
608 Other disorders of male genital organs
626 Disorders of menstruation and other abnormal bleeding from female genital tract
607 Disorders of penis
629 Other disorders of female genital organs
602 Other disorders of prostate
000 Other disease in disease class 10
599 Other disorders of urethra and urinary tract
611 Other disorders of breast
600 Hyperplasia of prostate
625 Pain and other symptoms associated with female genital organs




623 Noninflammatory disorders of vagina
616 Inflammatory disease of cervix, vagina, and vulva
627 Menopausal and postmenopausal disorders
601 Inflammatory diseases of prostate
620 Noninflammatory disorders of ovary, fallopian tube, and broad ligament
610 Benign mammary dysplasias
628 Infertility, female
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10.DISEASES OF THE GENITOURINARY SYSTEM
36Figure 1.11: Associations between Obesity and Complications of Pregnancy, Childbirth, and the Puerperium.
648. Effect: 130% Share: 32%
000. Effect: 32% Share: 10%
669. Effect: 18% Share: 13%
634. Effect: 17% Share: 2%
644. Effect: 9% Share: 8%
650. Effect: -6% Share: 4%
648 Other current conditions in the mother classifiable elsewhere but complicating pr...
000 Other disease in disease class 11
669 Other complications of labor and delivery, not elsewhere classified
634 Spontaneous abortion
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11.COMPLICATIONS OF PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH, AND THE PUERPERIUM
37Figure 1.12: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Skin and Subcutaneous Tissue.
680. Effect: 113% Share: 28%
682. Effect: 108% Share: 27%
703. Effect: 57% Share: 17%
681. Effect: 54% Share: 13%
707. Effect: 38% Share: 10%
698. Effect: 37% Share: 1%
705. Effect: 34% Share: 14%
686. Effect: 28% Share: 6%
696. Effect: 21% Share: 5%
708. Effect: 21% Share: 6%
701. Effect: 14% Share: 5%
695. Effect: 6% Share: 6%
684. Effect: 4% Share: -4%
691. Effect: 3% Share: 0%
000. Effect: 0% Share: 7%
704. Effect: -2% Share: -1%
692. Effect: -5% Share: -3%
693. Effect: -5% Share: 0%
709. Effect: -14% Share: -9%
700. Effect: -16% Share: -10%
706. Effect: -18% Share: -10%
690. Effect: -25% Share: -10%
702. Effect: -34% Share: -18%
680 Carbuncle and furuncle
682 Other cellulitis and abscess
703 Diseases of nail
681 Cellulitis and abscess of finger and toe
707 Chronic ulcer of skin
698 Pruritus and related conditions
705 Disorders of sweat glands
686 Other local infections of skin and subcutaneous tissue
696 Psoriasis and similar disorders
708 Urticaria
701 Other hypertrophic and atrophic conditions of skin
695 Erythematous conditions
684 Impetigo
691 Atopic dermatitis and related conditions
000 Other disease in disease class 12
704 Diseases of hair and hair follicles
692 Contact dermatitis and other eczema
693 Dermatitis due to substances taken internally
709 Other disorders of skin and subcutaneous tissue
700 Corns and callosities
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12.DISEASES OF THE SKIN AND SUBCUTANEOUS TISSUE
38Figure 1.13: Associations between Obesity and Diseases of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue.
717. Effect: 138% Share: 28%
721. Effect: 129% Share: 32%
716. Effect: 110% Share: 29%
715. Effect: 93% Share: 24%
722. Effect: 62% Share: 20%
729. Effect: 60% Share: 16%
719. Effect: 48% Share: 13%
726. Effect: 43% Share: 15%
734. Effect: 38% Share: 7%
724. Effect: 30% Share: 11%
728. Effect: 30% Share: 7%
714. Effect: 30% Share: 4%
710. Effect: 27% Share: 9%
736. Effect: 26% Share: 12%
718. Effect: 25% Share: 2%
727. Effect: 19% Share: 9%
735. Effect: 17% Share: 9%
000. Effect: 10% Share: 0%
723. Effect: -2% Share: 1%
738. Effect: -5% Share: -4%
737. Effect: -18% Share: -10%
733. Effect: -37% Share: -19%
717 Internal derangement of knee
721 Spondylosis and allied disorders
716 Other and unspecified arthropathies
715 Osteoarthrosis and allied disorders
722 Intervertebral disc disorders
729 Other disorders of soft tissues
719 Other and unspecified disorder of joint
726 Peripheral enthesopathies and allied syndromes
734 Flat foot
724 Other and unspecified disorders of back
728 Disorders of muscle, ligament, and fascia
714 Rheumatoid arthritis and other inflammatory polyarthropathies
710 Diffuse diseases of connective tissue
736 Other acquired deformities of limbs
718 Other derangement of joint
727 Other disorders of synovium, tendon, and bursa
735 Acquired deformities of toe
000 Other disease in disease class 13
723 Other disorders of cervical region
738 Other acquired deformity
737 Curvature of spine
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13.DISEASES OF THE MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM AND CONNECTIVE TISSUE
39Figure 1.14: Associations between Obesity and Congenital Anomalies.
758. Effect: 172% Share: 31%
753. Effect: 53% Share: 9%
756. Effect: 44% Share: 15%
755. Effect: 30% Share: 10%
000. Effect: 8% Share: 3%
759. Effect: 5% Share: -1%
746. Effect: -5% Share: 1%
758 Chromosomal anomalies
753 Congenital anomalies of urinary system
756 Other congenital musculoskeletal anomalies
755 Other congenital anomalies of limbs
000 Other disease in disease class 14
759 Other and unspecified congenital anomalies































-100 0 100 200 300 400
Estimated Percentage Effect
Point Estimate 99% CI when significant 99% CI when insignificant
Associations between Obesity and Disease Incidence
14.CONGENITAL ANOMALIES
40Figure 1.15: Associations between Obesity and Certain Conditions Originating in the Perinatal Period.
000. Effect: 12% Share: 4%
765. Effect: -5% Share: 0%
000 Other disease in disease class 15































-40 -20 0 20 40 60
Estimated Percentage Effect
Point Estimate 99% CI when significant 99% CI when insignificant
Associations between Obesity and Disease Incidence
15.CERTAIN CONDITIONS ORIGINATING IN THE PERINATAL PERIOD
41Figure 1.16: Associations between Obesity and Symptoms, Signs, and Ill-De￿ned Conditions.
790. Effect: 103% Share: 25%
796. Effect: 102% Share: 28%
791. Effect: 90% Share: 20%
794. Effect: 75% Share: 30%
000. Effect: 45% Share: -6%
782. Effect: 43% Share: 12%
786. Effect: 40% Share: 10%
799. Effect: 35% Share: 9%
788. Effect: 32% Share: 6%
787. Effect: 29% Share: 8%
780. Effect: 25% Share: 6%
783. Effect: 19% Share: 0%
789. Effect: 16% Share: 5%
784. Effect: 14% Share: 5%
781. Effect: 13% Share: -1%
785. Effect: 9% Share: 2%
793. Effect: -10% Share: -6%
795. Effect: -16% Share: -7%
797. Effect: -39% Share: -32%
790 Nonspecific findings on examination of blood
796 Other nonspecific abnormal findings
791 Nonspecific findings on examination of urine
794 Nonspecific abnormal results of function studies
000 Other disease in disease class 16
782 Symptoms involving skin and other integumentary tissue
786 Symptoms involving respiratory system and other chest symptoms
799 Other ill-defined and unknown causes of morbidity and mortality
788 Symptoms involving urinary system
787 Symptoms involving digestive system
780 General symptoms
783 Symptoms concerning nutrition, metabolism, and development
789 Other symptoms involving abdomen and pelvis
784 Symptoms involving head and neck
781 Symptoms involving nervous and musculoskeletal systems
785 Symptoms involving cardiovascular system
793 Nonspecific abnormal findings on radiological and other examination of body structure
795 Nonspecific abnormal histological and immunological findings
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16.SYMPTOMS, SIGNS, AND ILL-DEFINED CONDITIONS
42Figure 1.17: Associations between Obesity and Injury and Poisoning.
835. Effect: 81% Share: 30%
836. Effect: 78% Share: 18%
827. Effect: 74% Share: 23%
824. Effect: 56% Share: 19%
846. Effect: 52% Share: 13%
823. Effect: 52% Share: 20%
998. Effect: 43% Share: 17%
822. Effect: 38% Share: 14%
844. Effect: 37% Share: 14%
944. Effect: 34% Share: 7%
949. Effect: 33% Share: 20%
845. Effect: 32% Share: 9%
996. Effect: 28% Share: 7%
945. Effect: 24% Share: 3%
825. Effect: 23% Share: 7%
992. Effect: 23% Share: 6%
943. Effect: 22% Share: 7%
843. Effect: 22% Share: 10%
924. Effect: 21% Share: 6%
840. Effect: 19% Share: 8%
959. Effect: 18% Share: 6%
994. Effect: 18% Share: 13%
847. Effect: 17% Share: 3%
839. Effect: 17% Share: 7%
916. Effect: 17% Share: 9%
995. Effect: 16% Share: 7%
893. Effect: 15% Share: 4%
923. Effect: 15% Share: 7%
989. Effect: 14% Share: 5%
881. Effect: 12% Share: -7%
917. Effect: 11% Share: 5%
826. Effect: 8% Share: 2%
883. Effect: 7% Share: 2%
000. Effect: 6% Share: 4%
815. Effect: 6% Share: -5%
812. Effect: 5% Share: -4%
882. Effect: 5% Share: 5%
841. Effect: 5% Share: -7%
920. Effect: 4% Share: -1%
892. Effect: 4% Share: -2%
848. Effect: 4% Share: 3%
879. Effect: 3% Share: -6%
927. Effect: 3% Share: -6%
910. Effect: 3% Share: -7%
818. Effect: 2% Share: 1%
805. Effect: -1% Share: -1%
922. Effect: -2% Share: -1%
891. Effect: -2% Share: -4%
813. Effect: -3% Share: -11%
919. Effect: -3% Share: 4%
814. Effect: -6% Share: -6%
831. Effect: -6% Share: -3%
842. Effect: -7% Share: -1%
850. Effect: -8% Share: -9%
871. Effect: -10% Share: -8%
854. Effect: -10% Share: -7%
977. Effect: -12% Share: -11%
807. Effect: -12% Share: -2%
816. Effect: -12% Share: -6%
873. Effect: -14% Share: -7%
999. Effect: -15% Share: 4%
918. Effect: -15% Share: -3%
884. Effect: -20% Share: -10%
921. Effect: -21% Share: -11%
930. Effect: -26% Share: -9%
933. Effect: -30% Share: -6%
802. Effect: -30% Share: -12%
808. Effect: -31% Share: -23%
810. Effect: -33% Share: -15%
952. Effect: -45% Share: -30%
820. Effect: -62% Share: -32%
835 Dislocation of hip
836 Dislocation of knee
827 Other, multiple, and ill-defined fractures of lower limb
824 Fracture of ankle
846 Sprains and strains of sacroiliac region
823 Fracture of tibia and fibula
998 Other complications of procedures, not elsewhere classified
822 Fracture of patella
844 Sprains and strains of knee and leg
944 Burn of wrist(s) and hand(s)
949 Burn, unspecified
845 Sprains and strains of ankle and foot
996 Complications peculiar to certain specified procedures
945 Burn of lower limb(s)
825 Fracture of one or more tarsal and metatarsal bones
992 Effects of heat and light
943 Burn of upper limb, except wrist and hand
843 Sprains and strains of hip and thigh
924 Contusion of lower limb and of other and unspecified sites
840 Sprains and strains of shoulder and upper arm
959 Injury, other and unspecified
994 Effects of other external causes
847 Sprains and strains of other and unspecified parts of back
839 Other, multiple, and ill-defined dislocations
916 Superficial injury of hip, thigh, leg, and ankle
995 Certain adverse effects, not elsewhere classified
893 Open wound of toe(s)
923 Contusion of upper limb
989 Toxic effect of other substances, chiefly nonmedicinal as to source
881 Open wound of elbow, forearm, and wrist
917 Superficial injury of foot and toe(s)
826 Fracture of one or more phalanges of foot
883 Open wound of finger(s)
000 Other disease in disease class 17
815 Fracture of metacarpal bone(s)
812 Fracture of humerus
882 Open wound of hand except finger(s) alone
841 Sprains and strains of elbow and forearm
920 Contusion of face, scalp, and neck except eye(s)
892 Open wound of foot except toe(s) alone
848 Other and ill-defined sprains and strains
879 Open wound of other and unspecified sites, except limbs
927 Crushing injury of upper limb
910 Superficial injury of face, neck, and scalp except eye
818 Ill-defined fractures of upper limb
805 Fracture of vertebral column without mention of spinal cord lesion
922 Contusion of trunk
891 Open wound of knee, leg [except thigh], and ankle
813 Fracture of radius and ulna
919 Superficial injury of other, multiple, and unspecified sites
814 Fracture of carpal bone(s)
831 Dislocation of shoulder
842 Sprains and strains of wrist and hand
850 Concussion
871 Open wound of eyeball
854 Intracranial injury of other and unspecified nature
977 Poisoning by other and unspecified drugs and medicinals
807 Fracture of rib(s), sternum, larynx, and trachea
816 Fracture of one or more phalanges of hand
873 Other open wound of head
999 Complications of medical care, not elsewhere classified
918 Superficial injury of eye and adnexa
884 Multiple and unspecified open wound of upper limb
921 Contusion of eye and adnexa
930 Foreign body on external eye
933 Foreign body in pharynx and larynx
802 Fracture of face bones
808 Fracture of pelvis
810 Fracture of clavicle
952 Spinal cord injury without evidence of spinal bone injury
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17.INJURY AND POISONING
43Figure 1.18: Associations between Obesity and Factors In￿ uencing Health Status and Contact with Health Services.
V81. Effect: 90% Share: 24%
V77. Effect: 63% Share: 20%
V49. Effect: 60% Share: 21%
V43. Effect: 33% Share: 10%
V15. Effect: 32% Share: 8%
V45. Effect: 24% Share: 6%
V04. Effect: 20% Share: 3%
V40. Effect: 20% Share: 8%
V12. Effect: 20% Share: 16%
V67. Effect: 18% Share: 2%
V47. Effect: 18% Share: 6%
V22. Effect: 17% Share: 10%
V72. Effect: 16% Share: 7%
V07. Effect: 16% Share: 4%
V65. Effect: 15% Share: -1%
V54. Effect: 15% Share: 5%
V68. Effect: 14% Share: 4%
V05. Effect: 11% Share: 4%
V24. Effect: 9% Share: 14%
V70. Effect: 8% Share: 4%
V10. Effect: 7% Share: 0%
V58. Effect: 6% Share: -2%
V62. Effect: 4% Share: -5%
V52. Effect: 2% Share: 4%
000. Effect: 0% Share: -6%
V41. Effect: -1% Share: -2%
V57. Effect: -2% Share: 4%
V48. Effect: -2% Share: -6%
V20. Effect: -3% Share: 0%
V30. Effect: -6% Share: -3%
V71. Effect: -6% Share: -2%
V61. Effect: -10% Share: -8%
V26. Effect: -15% Share: -9%
V76. Effect: -17% Share: -7%
V53. Effect: -20% Share: -10%
V82. Effect: -22% Share: -17%
V74. Effect: -27% Share: -15%
V25. Effect: -29% Share: -13%
V81 Special screening for cardiovascular, respiratory, and genitourinary diseases
V77 Special screening for endocrine, nutritional, metabolic, and immunity disorders
V49 Problems with limbs and other problems
V43 Organ or tissue replaced by other means
V15 Other personal history presenting hazards to health
V45 Other postsurgical states
V04 Need for prophylactic vaccination and inoculation against certain viral diseases
V40 Mental and behavioral problems
V12 Personal history of certain other diseases
V67 Follow-up examination
V47 Other problems with internal organs
V22 Normal pregnancy
V72 Special investigations and examinations
V07 Need for isolation and other prophylactic measures
V65 Other persons seeking consultation without complaint or sickness
V54 Other orthopedic aftercare
V68 Encounters for administrative purposes
V05 Need for other prophylactic vaccination and inoculation against single diseases
V24 Postpartum care and examination
V70 General medical examination
V10 Personal history of malignant neoplasm
V58 Other and unspecified aftercare
V62 Other psychosocial circumstances
V52 Fitting and adjustment of prosthetic device
000 Other disease in disease class 18
V41 Problems with special senses and other special functions
V57 Care involving use of rehabilitation procedures
V48 Problems with head, neck, and trunk
V20 Health supervision of infant or child
V30 Single liveborn
V71 Observation and evaluation for suspected conditions
V61 Other family circumstances
V26 Procreative management
V76 Special screening for malignant neoplasms
V53 Fitting and adjustment of other device
V82 Special screening for other conditions
V74 Special screening examination for bacterial and spirochetal diseases
V25 Encounter for contraceptive management
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY CLASSIFICATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING
HEALTH STATUS AND CONTACT WITH HEALTH SERVICES
44Figure 2: Associations between Obesity and Pharmaceutical Expenditures by Therapeutic Category.
53. Effect: 398% Share:59%
52. Effect: 316% Share:59%
51. Effect: 312% Share:50%
50. Effect: 179% Share:38%
49. Effect: 116% Share:30%
48. Effect: 103% Share:22%
47. Effect: 87% Share:23%
46. Effect: 84% Share:13%
45. Effect: 78% Share:18%
44. Effect: 77% Share:21%
43. Effect: 76% Share:20%
42. Effect: 75% Share:24%
41. Effect: 74% Share:20%
40. Effect: 67% Share:25%
39. Effect: 59% Share:17%
38. Effect: 51% Share:13%
37. Effect: 47% Share:16%
36. Effect: 40% Share:11%
35. Effect: 36% Share:9%
34. Effect: 32% Share:9%
33. Effect: 30% Share:9%
32. Effect: 28% Share:12%
31. Effect: 28% Share:3%
30. Effect: 26% Share:10%
29. Effect: 25% Share:13%
28. Effect: 24% Share:5%
27. Effect: 22% Share:12%
26. Effect: 21% Share:1%
25. Effect: 21% Share:7%
24. Effect: 20% Share:5%
23. Effect: 18% Share:-1%
22. Effect: 17% Share:4%
21. Effect: 17% Share:-1%
20. Effect: 17% Share:6%
19. Effect: 15% Share:3%
18. Effect: 14% Share:5%
17. Effect: 14% Share:4%
16. Effect: 9% Share:0%
15. Effect: 5% Share:4%
14. Effect: 2% Share:0%
13. Effect: -1% Share:-2%
12. Effect: -2% Share:1%
11. Effect: -8% Share:3%
10. Effect: -11% Share:-6%
9. Effect: -17% Share:-3%
8. Effect: -17% Share:-4%
7. Effect: -24% Share:-10%
6. Effect: -25% Share:-17%
5. Effect: -31% Share:-15%
4. Effect: -34% Share:-16%
3. Effect: -50% Share:-36%
2. Effect: -61% Share:-31%
1. Effect: -67% Share:-28%
53. Blood glucose regulator
52. Antigout
51. Antipsychotics/Antimanics
50. Repl/regs of electrolytes/water balance
49. Hypertension
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